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Contents	
Argentina-UK: Negotiatir	ng Positions i
Israel-Lebanon: Israeli	Military Buildup Continues 1
USSR-Yugoslavia: Trade I	Problems 2
Czechoslovakia: Private	Enterprise Encouraged 4
EC-Japan: Criticism of I	Trade Practices 5
China-Vietnam: Reaction	to Vietnamese Party Congress 6

25X1 25X1

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RGENTINA-UK: Negotiating Positions	
//The UK and Argentina are holding to nough Buenos Aires may be considering its ave increased their tilt toward Argentina. Ettling other South American countries who ith their own longstanding territorial disp	options. Soviet media The dispute is un- see clear parallels
A massive demonstration in Buend or todayscheduled to take place at f State Haig meets with President Gar Argentina's stand on the Falklands Comment: //Several recent report that the Argentines are looking for a both for themselves and the UK, but that their sovereignty of at least the	t the time Secretary altieriin support s. rts have suggested a facesaving way out only on the condition he Falkland Islands
ut not necessarily South Georgia and slandsbe recognized.//	de the Bouth Banawien
K Position	
//As a potential military showdon show the stance of support for the support for the stance. Defense Secretary Notes in the stance of the stan	r the government's t's declaration of
//As a potential military showded sometimes been no slackening of support for ugh stance. Defense Secretary Note impending blockade was favorably to the secretary blockade was favorably block	r the government's t's declaration of
//As a potential military showded is been no slackening of support for bugh stance. Defense Secretary Note impending blockade was favorably in	r the government's t's declaration of received by the public
//As a potential military showded sometimes been no slackening of support for ugh stance. Defense Secretary Note impending blockade was favorably to the secretary blockade was favorably block	r the government's t's declaration of received by the public

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Comment: //The declaration that an will go into effect on Monday has reduced a military conflict may begin. The Britishelieve that raising the prospect of fast has galvanized world opinion and given the leadership pause.//	d the time before ish apparently t military action

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ii

25X1

25X1

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Soviet media, after some initial uncertaing now portraying the Falkland dispute as part of "general problem of decolonization" and are accepted UK of trying to hold the islands "against consense and the decisions of the UN." TASS, moreover the British Task Force creates "an immediate the international peace and security." Moscow also leging that the US is helping the UK, but at the time mediating out of concern that a showdown control that the time fall of the Thatcher government.	the using common ver, said reat to is al- e same ould cause
Yesterday, for example, a Foreign Ministry officinitially described the Soviet position as one neutrality and then severely criticized the Bri	of
incuttating and their beverery errorate one be-	
Comment: //The nations of South America a ingly concerned that unless the crisis is settl they also will be drawn into the dispute either	ed quickly,

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25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

of fraternal ties to Argentina or because some national-

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istic groups will see this as an opportunity to settle old scores with their neighbors. For now, however, the numerous stirrings appear to be precautionary.//

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iv

25X1

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SRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli Military Bu	ildup Continues
//Additional troops and equipment arr	ived in northern Israel
esterday, and the Palestinia <u>ns are becomin</u>	
bout Israeli intentions.//	
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srael's elite 35th Parainfantry Bri	gade were preparing
or field operations at a staging ba nd that additional troops, tanks, a	
re in position in the Shelomi area	along the north-
estern Lebanese border. Israeli tr lso were arriving in northeastern G	oops and equipment
orthern Golan Heights. In addition	, there was unusually
ntense activity at the Haifa Naval	Base yesterday.//
Comment: //The augmentation of	Israeli forces along
Comment: //The augmentation of he northern border and on the Golan	Heights probably
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for	Heights probably ces in the north
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for pproximates the buildup there last	Heights probably ces in the north December that was
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for pproximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for pproximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00 evel could be reached today. Israe	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This limit then be able
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for pproximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This will then be able tro Lebanon while
he northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for pproximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00 evel could be reached today. Israe o send up to a division into souther roviding adequate defense on the Go	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This will then be able tro Lebanon while
ne northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for oproximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00 evel could be reached today. Israe of send up to a division into souther coviding adequate defense on the Go	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This will then be able tro Lebanon while
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ne northern border and on the Golan ill continue until the level of for proximates the buildup there last stimated to include 23,000 to 24,00 evel could be reached today. Israe send up to a division into souther coviding adequate defense on the Go	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This I will then be able orn Lebanon while lan against a possible
e northern border and on the Golan 11 continue until the level of for proximates the buildup there last timated to include 23,000 to 24,00 vel could be reached today. Israe send up to a division into southe oviding adequate defense on the Go	Heights probably ces in the north December that was 0 troops. This will then be able tro Lebanon while

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1

Top Secret	2
USSR-YUGOSLAVIA: Trade Problems	
Soviet demands for adjustments in bilateral trade, prompted by Moscow's hard currency difficulties, may cause new problems for Yugoslavia's troubled economy and strain delicate bilateral relations.	2
	2
Shortly before Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit in early April, an authoritative newspaper in Belgrade revealed that the Soviets are seeking revisions in the 1981-85 trade pact. Moscow wants to buy more food and consumer goods instead of industrial products that are	
consumer goods instead of industrial products that are not competitive in Western markets.	2
The article also stated that Soviet energy and raw material deliveries last year dropped by 25 percent, and oil deliveries were 360,000 tons below agreed levels. It predicted "stagnation" and "insurmountable difficulties" in bilateral economic cooperation if these trends continue. The Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade complained to senior Yugoslav officials about the article during Gromyko's visit.	2
The Soviets' share of Yugoslav exports grew 50 percentto about a third of overall exportsbetween 1979 and 1981. The increase was mainly due to imports of industrial goods in compensation for the then increasing costs of Soviet oil imports. Yugoslavia pays world market prices for its oil imports from the USSR.	2
Comment: Moscow's willingness to risk worsening relations with Belgrade over this issue is another sign of its concern over its hard currency problems. //The Yugoslavs, however, probably regard the new demands as an attempt to use economic leverage	2
	2
They cannot afford to redirect many food and consumer products from the domestic and Western export markets.	,2
One long-term impact of the new Soviet demands may be to spur Belgrade to reform its economy in order to increase the competitiveness of its industrial goods in	

2

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25X1

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Private Enterprise Enco	uraged
Czechoslovakia is beginning to enco	urage private
initiative in the agricultural and servi the performance of government-controlled	ce sectors because enterprises has
been erratic and has failed to meet cons	umer demand. A
retail trade law enacted early this mont viduals to run service enterprises and l	n allows indi- egalizes the sale
of privately produced goods. This follower reforms earlier this year promoting part	ws agricultural
farming and permitting tax-free sales.	-time private
Comment: The Czechoslovak moveal	though not as
far reaching as recent Hungarian measure tant victory for moderates and show Prag	sare an impor-
over the stagnating economy. Party hard	liners apparently
are beginning to realize that growing ecorequire new approaches.	onomic problems
4	Top Secret

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EC-JAPAN: Criticism of Trade Practi	ces
//International pressure on Toke surplus is increasing. The EC this request for GATT consultations by is on concern about the high rate of greports to the EC and the low level of imports of manufactured goods. In a Economics Minister Lambsdorff attack practices during a recent visit to Jathev could lead to a breakdown in the	week followed its suing a detailed note owth in Japanese ex- Japanese total ddition, West German ed Japanese trade apan, saying that
Comment: //The EC has little let the GATT proceedings, by themselves, effect on Japanese policy. Japanese probably are worried that the EC com to isolate Japan at the OECD ministe and the Versailles summit in June. in particular, will add to their dis West Germany previously has spoken o tionism. These criticisms have put Japanese to draw up a substantial tr package before the summit.//	would have a minimal officials, however, plaints will help rial meetings in May Lambsdorff's comments, comfiture because ut against protecmore pressure on the
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HINA-VIETNAM: Reaction to Vietna	amese Party Congress	
Beijing's public assessment of arty Congress buttresses its case ion to Hanoi's domination of Kampre blaming Vietnam's economic proampuchea. They also point out the the leadership by hardliners and Politburo of the Vietnamese core signs that Hanoi will increase ions there.	e for continued opposi- buchea. The Chinese bblems on the war in hat a stronger grip hd the appointment to bommander in Kampuchea	
Comment: Beijing wants to commore conciliatory approach to Haternamese to moderate their ambitaina will continue to emphasize to ASEAN unity in maintaining prespectation prevent the Vietnamese from easid obtaining Western economic aid	noi will persuade the ions in Kampuchea. These issues to encour-essure on Vietnam and ing their isolation	

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